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This paper use Swedish establishment-level panel data on job turnover
and wages to test the hypothesis of a positive relation between job re-
allocation and degree of wage compression as proposed by Bertola &
Rogerson (1997). The eect of wage dispersion on job turnover is
negative and signicant in the manufacturing sector. The wage com-
pression eect is stronger on job destruction than on job creation,
suggesting that wages are more rigid downward than upward. For
the service sector results are reversed. Further results include (i) a
strong positive relationship between the industry share of temporary
employees and job turnover and (ii) a negative relationship between
the amount of work-time exibility and job reallocation. The esti-
mation method is industry xed-eect models that control for sector
heterogeneity.
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with data.1 Introduction
During the past decade the rate of job reallocation in dierent markets has
been estimated in numerous empirical studies.1 Studies based on US and
European data yield very similar results: the gross job turnover rate is ap-
proximately 20 percent in observed countries. Given the large institutional
dierences in terms of job security legislation and unionization, the similarity
between Europe and the US may seem surprising.
The question as to why economies with very dierent labor market regu-
lations give rise to similar rates of job turnover has not received much atten-
tion in the literature. One possible explanation for similar labor reallocation
rates across labor markets with very dierent employment-protection legis-
lation concerns dierences in wage setting institutions. Bertola & Rogerson
(1997) argue that although job-security laws lead to lower job ows, its im-
pact might be reduced if other institutional dierences have opposite eects.
One such dierence is wage setting. Wage setting institutions are, on aver-
age, much more centralized in Europe than in the US. This in turn leads to
greater uniformity of wages across industries and rms. A compressed wage
structure implies that rms cannot adjust wages as a response to positive or
negative demand shocks. Instead, rms have to adjust either the number of
employees or the number of hours worked by the workforce. This implies, all
else equal, that there is a positive relationship between the degree of wage
compression and the magnitude of gross job ows.2
Bertola & Rogerson's conclusion is that when labor protection laws and
wage setting institutions are considered jointly, the result might very well
be that job ows in countries with high adjustment costs and a compressed
wage structure mimic those in countries with low adjustment costs and de-
centralized wages. If wage-setting institutions have a signicant eect on the
reallocation of jobs, this may partly explain reported similarities between
European and US job reallocation rates.
Evidence presented in OECD (1993) and Blau & Kahn (1996) is consis-
tent with the notion that wages are more compressed in Europe than in the
US. It also gives an indication that wage setting institutions and the degree
1See Dunne et al. (1989), Leonard (1987) and Davis & Haltiwanger (1992,1997) for job
ows. Abowd et al. (1996), Anderson & Meyer (1994), Burda & Wyplosz (1994), Burgess
et al. (1996), Hamermesh (1996) and Albeack & S orensen (1998) study both job- and
worker ows. Three Swedish studies are Andersson (1999), Arai & Heyman (2000) and
Persson (1998). For related theoretical literature on job ows, see e.g. Hopenhayn (1992),
Burda & Wyplosz (1994), Caballero & Hammour (1994), Mortensen (1994), Mortensen &
Pissarides (1994) and Caballero & Hammour (1996).
2A similar relationship can be found in Moene & Wallerstein (1997). They investigate
the eects of wage compression through centralized bargaining on growth.
1of wage compression very well may be an important factor behind observed
similarities between European and US gross job ows. Despite the atten-
tion that Bertola & Rogerson's article has received in explaining similarities
between European and US job ows, their model has not been empirically
tested.
In this paper I will empirically test the Bertola & Rogerson hypothe-
sis of a positive relationship between the degree of wage compression and
job turnover on Swedish panel data. In order to accommodate the Swedish
institutional framework I will extend the Bertola & Rogerson model by in-
troducing the presence of two types of employment contracts and also take
into account that total labor input is a function of both the number of em-
ployees and hours worked. The rst extension will take into account the
trend towards dierentiated employment-contracts in many countries. The
presence of xed-term contracts with low adjustment costs makes employ-
ment more responsive to shocks in labor demand, and hence more volatile.
However, volatile temporary employment contracts can coexist with more
stable employment for employees with permanent contracts. This can pos-
sibly lead to a segmented labor market where one group of workers with
unstable employment act as a buer for changes in labor demand for labor.
The second extension takes into account that in response to a negative shock,
rms can choose between reducing the number of employees and paying the
relevant adjustment costs or, by adjusting the number of hours worked by
the employees.
Due to data quality considerations such as country dierences in sam-
ple coverage, denitions of establishments, the ability to link establishments
over time and sector coverage, cross-country comparisons on gross job ows
and wage dispersion are problematic.3 Instead, this paper will use Swedish
data to analyze the relationship between wage compression and job real-
location at the industry level. The data contain quarterly information on
establishment employment turnover and wages for a panel of more than 10
000 establishments in the Swedish private sector, covering the time period
1992:3 to 1999:2.
Very few studies use econometric methods to explain variation in job
ows. This study will estimate the theoretical model in reduced form using
panel data. The estimation technique is xed-eects regression. The xed-
eects model controls for unobservable industry heterogeneity which can be
correlated with the included independent variables and cause an endogeneity
problem.
Estimating industry xed-eects models for 14 two-digit industries (6 in
3These problems are discussed in Davis & Haltiwanger (1999).
2manufacturing and 8 in non-manufacturing) show results that suggest sub-
stantial sector heterogeneity. The eect of wage dispersion on job turnover
is negative and signicant in the manufacturing sector. This supports the
Bertola & Rogerson hypothesis that a more compressed wage structure will
result in higher job reallocation rates. Running separate regressions for job
creation and destruction show a negative and signicant eect of wage disper-
sion on job destruction, whereas the eect is insignicant in the job creation-
equation. These results are consistent with wages being more rigid down-
wards than upwards. The degree of wage dispersion has no signicant eect
on job turnover in the non-manufacturing sector
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: A brief description
of the Swedish labor legislation is presented in Section 2. This section also
describes the Swedish wage-setting system. A theoretical model that links
wage setting, employment protection legislation and turnover of jobs is pre-
sented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data. The empirical specication
is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 reports estimation results and discusses
their implication for the observed stylized fact that European and US gross
job ows are of the same magnitude. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The institutional setting in Sweden { labor
market legislation and wage formation
2.1 Labor market legislation
The Swedish Employment Protection Act (LAS) has traditionally been built
on two principles: permanent contracts for an indenite period of time as
the normal type of employment and dismissals based on a just cause only.
Legislation also contains rules on notication periods and priority rules in
case of layos. The last two decades has seen a gradual liberalization of
labor laws. For instance, in 1982 the use of xed-term contracts was relaxed
with the introduction of a trial period. Strict priority rules such as last in,
rst out, have also been relaxed.
In comparison, the US system is characterized by little statutory regula-
tions at the federal level and varying legislation from state to state. At the
basis of American labor legislation lies the principle of employers right to
hire and re at will. Furthermore, employers are basically free to determine
length of prior notication, since statutory provisions are lacking. Only in a
few states are dismissals restricted by statutory requirements of just cause. A
federal law, giving some protection to workers in case of mass layos is found
in the so-called Plant Closing Act from 1988. Finally, around 25 percent of
3American workers are protected by provisions in collective agreements.
Swedish labor legislation is much more restrictive for permanent contracts
than for temporary ones. In order to restrict the use of temporary contracts,
LAS gives a list of cases in which xed-term contracts are allowed.4 The
most important cases in which time-limited contracts are permitted for are
(i) one trial period of six months, (ii) seasonal or temporarily excessive work
loads, (iii) replacement of employees on leave and a few other cases. For
some cases there are limitations on the duration of the contract. Employees
are for example obliged to transform a temporary contract to a permanent
one if the employee has had time-limited contracts for 3 years out of a 5 year
period.
In 1997, rules concerning xed-term contracts were relaxed in so far that
these were possible without specifying an objective reason, under the con-
dition that no more than ve workers at the same time be employed on a
xed-term basis. Furthermore, the maximum duration for temporary con-
tracts was extended to 18 months for newly established rms.
Concerning termination costs of employment contracts, LAS is more re-
strictive for permanent contracts than for temporary ones. Under these cir-
cumstances, an increase in rm employment is likely to start by an increase
in the number of temporary workers. In this way, rms obtain an option to
transform a fraction of temporary contracts to permanent contracts if initial
uncertainty about demand decreases. Analogously, in a downturn, temporary
contracts are the rst to be terminated. Lower termination costs associated
with temporary contracts enable rms to reduce adjustment costs by using
temporary workers as a buer for employment adjustment.5 This implies
larger volatility for temporary contracts compared to permanent contracts.
The possibility of using exible workers in the production process dier
between rms in dierent industries. Table 1 displays large sector-variation
in the fraction of temporary workers. Service industries like trade, real estate
and other services have the highest fraction, whereas the lowest fraction is
found in traditional manufacturing industries such as machinery, electricity
and textiles. These fractions are fairly stable over time.
2.2 Wage formation
For several decades, beginning in the 1950s, Swedish wage formation was
heavily inuenced by the principle of a solidarity wage policy. Solidarity
4Additional possibilities for xed-term contracts may be created in collective agree-
ments between employer and employee organisations.
5See Saint-Paul (1996), Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) and Alonso-Borrego (1998)
for analyses of temporary and permanent employment.
4wage policy with its emphasis on \equal pay for equal work" was one of
the cornerstones of the so-called Swedish model. From an industrial policy
perspective, the idea behind \equal pay for equal work" was to set pressure
on, and gradually force out of the market weak rms, thereby enhancing
industry productivity. Active labor market policy had the role of allocating
labor from declining to expanding industries and regions. Solidaristic wage
policy was made possible by a highly centralized wage bargaining system.
During the period 1956-83, centrally negotiated wage agreements were
made by the two main parties in the Swedish labor market: the Central
organization of blue-collar workers (LO) and the Central confederation of
private employers (SAF). These framework wage agreements were then fol-
lowed by negotiations at both industry and local levels. Centrally negotiated
wage levels were more or less binding and often included special low wage
provisions, aimed at increasing the relative wage of workers at the lower end
of the wage distribution. As a result of the egalitarian wage policy, wage
dispersion in Sweden, measured as the total variance of blue-collar workers,
declined by 75 percent between 1962 and 1983 (see Hibbs & Locking (1999)).
As pointed out by Hibbs & Locking (1999), the Swedish wage distribution
was so compressed that a relative wage increase of around 30 percent was
sucient to carry a worker from the 10th to the 90th decile of the wage dis-
tribution.
The decline in wage inequality ended in the 1980s. This came about
by the breakdown of centrally negotiated wage agreements between LO and
SAF. Wage agreements after 1983 have primarily involved industry-level ne-
gotiations. This implies that Sweden has gone from a tri-level bargaining
system to a two-level system with industry- and plant-level bargaining. Fur-
thermore, the egalitarian view on wage setting was gradually dissolved and
practically disappeared around 1990. The eect of these changes in the wage-
formation process on relative wages was quite dramatic: between 1983 and
1993, the relative wage dispersion increased by 49 percent (see Edin & Holm-
lund (1992) and Hibbs & Locking (1999)). This means that wage dispersion
in the early 1990s was of the same order of magnitude as that in the mid-
1970s. The trend towards increased wage inequality continued in the 1990s,
hand in hand with a more decentralized wage bargaining system. However,
the Swedish wage distribution is, in an international perspective still, very
compressed
53 Theoretical Model
There are two types of workers: workers with permanent contracts (lP) and
workers with temporary contracts (lT). The contracts dier in hiring and
ring costs. Adjustment costs are higher for permanent contracts than for
temporary contracts. Given that employment legislation concerning perma-
nent and temporary contracts is identical in all industries I assume that the
possibilities to use temporary workers in the production process is exoge-
nous and constant over time for each industry. This means that rms in
industries with a high fraction of temporary workers to a higher degree can
use temporary contracts as a buer for shifts in labor demand in contrast
to rms with a low fraction of temporary employees. Consequently, costs
for adjusting the labor force become lower for rms with a high fraction
of temporary employees than for rms with a low fraction of workers with
temporary contracts.
In the model there is a continuum of rms with a total mass of 1. In
every period rms are subject to an idiosyncratic demand (or productivity)
shock. With a certain probability the rm is either in a "good" state, G,
or in a "bad" state, B, with B < G. As in Bertola (1990) I assume that
the state of each rm is characterized by a two-state Markov process. The
transition probability, p, is symmetric with p being the probability of a rm
moving from the good (bad) state to the bad (good) state. Each rm's state
is uncorrelated to the state of other rm's so in every period p=2 rms switch
from the good state to the bad state at the same time as p=2 rms move
from the bad state to the good state.
Firms maximize the discounted value of current and future prots. For
each time period and state i 2 fG;Bg, the prots for a representative rm









iL   ACP   ACT (1)
where the term in parenthesis is the rm's revenue. L = LP +LT is total
labor input consisting of permanent and temporary labor. ACP and ACT
are adjustment costs for permanent and temporary workers, respectively. In
every period, the rm set employment so that the expected marginal revenue
product is equal to the wage plus adjustment-costs. The marginal revenue
product is equal to i - Li. Wages are exogenous but state-contingent in the
model. This means that w = wG in "good" times whereas w = wB in "bad"
times with wG > wB.6 The model can apply to any type of wage-setting
6In accordance with Swedish wage formation, wages are the same for permanent and
temporary employees.
6institutions, since what will determine job turnover is the degree of wage
dispersion. In a highly decentralized system, wages will be determined by
the state of the individual rm, giving rise to wages that are closely linked to
the current state. This will not be the case in a centralized system where the
relationship between individual productivity and wages is weaker. Therefore,
the dierence between wG and wB becomes smaller.
L in equation (1) can be seen as total labor input. Total labor input
includes both the number of workers and the number of hours worked. Total
labor input can subsequently be decomposed as the product of the number
of employees and the amount of hours they work per period, that is L = hl.
Given that working hours only are exible upwards, let the number of working
hours, h, in the two states be given by
h
G = h(1 + ) if = 
G (2)
h
B = h if = 
B
where h is the negotiated number of hours per employee and  is the
amount of overtime that employers can use during expansions,  2 (0;MAX].7









B   h(1 + )l
B
To solve for optimal labor demand in the two states we must rst dene
the rm's value function in the two states. The value functions for rms in
expansion (V G) and in recession (V B) are given by:
V
G = 




















G + (1   p)V
B
i
The optimal employment policy for rms in expansion implies that the
marginal increase in revenue from hiring l people is equal to the marginal
7In Europe the scope for substituting hours for workers is in reality asymmetric. Em-
ployers cannot decrease the number of hours worked for the workforce, and thereby save
on the wage per employee. The extent to which overtime is used is in many European
countries determined through negotiations between employer organizations and unions or
through legislation.
7cost of hiring. Analogously, for rms in recession, the optimal employment
policy is to equate the shadow loss of revenues from dismissing workers to the
ring cost. Hence in optimum the following relationship must be satised:
V
G = lPHP + lTHT (5)
V
B = lPFP + lTFT
where lP and lT are the change in the number of permanent and
temporary employees, respectively. HP, HT, FP and FT are the hiring-and
ring costs for the two types of workers with HP > HT and FP > FT. This
implies that rms with a higher fraction of temporary employees more easily
can adjust to changes in demand by using its stock of temporary workers.

































where H  lPHP+lTHT and F  lPFP+lTFT. In steady state, 50
percent of the rms are in the good state while the remaining 50 percent are
in the bad state. Given the symmetric Markov process, job creation equals
employment growth in expanding industries (lG   lB) times the number of
rms that move from recession to expansion (p=2). Analogously, job destruc-
tion is equal to j(p=2)(lB   lG)j. Summing job creation and job destruction





















where N is total employment. Substituting (6) into (7) yields the follow-
ing expression for the job reallocation rate:
JRR =
h
(G   B)   (wG   wB)  
r+2p












From equation (8) we see that job reallocation is increasing in the degree
of wage compression. Equation (8) also states that job reallocation is in-
creasing in the probability of switching states and decreasing in the amount
8of hours worked and overtime. More frequent use of overtime in expansions
will lead to less new hires and less turnover of labor. Furthermore, job real-
location is increasing in the dierence between G and B, a measure of how
volatile the business cycles are. Finally, the level of job reallocation is nega-
tively related to the cost of hiring and ring the two types of workers. This
in turn depends on the fraction of temporary employees. Firms that have a
high fraction can more easily adapt to changes in demand by adjusting its
stock of temporary employees. This is due to hiring and ring costs being
lower for temporary contracts than for permanent ones.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data are from Short Term Wage Statistics (Konjunkturstatistik, l oner
f or privat sektor) and Short Term Employment Statistics (Kortperiodisk Sys-
sels attningsstatistik) collected by Statistics Sweden (SCB). These data con-
tain information on employment turnover and wages for a panel of more
than 10 000 establishments in the non-agriculture private sector. The Short
Term Wage Statistics collects information on wages for blue- and white-collar
workers.8 Data are quarterly for the period 1991-95 and monthly from 1996
and onwards. A representative sample is drawn from the population of pri-
vate sector establishments with at least ve employees, stratied according
to industry aliation and employment size. The sample covers establish-
ments/plants in machinery and mining (sic-codes C+D) and rms in the ser-
vice sectors. For blue-collar workers the survey asks questions about number
of hours worked, number of overtime hours worked, average hourly earn-
ings excluding and including retroactive wage supplements, and number of
blue-collar employees. For white-collar workers the variables are number of
hours worked, number of overtime hours worked, negotiated monthly salary
excluding and including commissions and retroactive wage supplements, and
number of white-collar employees. For all rms and establishments 5-digit
sic-codes are available. Figures 1 and 2 depict real wages and yearly real
wage changes for the Swedish private sector.
- Figures 1 and 2 about here -
From the gures we see that real wages were more or less unchanged
during the period 1992-95 but have thereafter increased. The real wage in-
creases after 1995 are mostly due to the low ination during this time period.9
8The two groups of workers are dened according to their union aliation.
9Ination decreased from above 10 percent in 1991 to around zero in 1999.
9The annual mean real wage increase for the entire period is 2.2 percent for
blue-collar workers and 2.7 percent for white-collar workers. Table 1 shows
descriptive statistics for 14 industries (6 in manufacturing and 8 in non-
manufacturing). The table displays large inter-industry wage dierentials.
For blue-collar workers, the highest wages are found in mining and wood,
whereas the lowest wages are in hotel and banking. White-collar workers re-
ceive the highest wages in banking and chemistry and the lowest in transport
and hotel.
- Figure 3 about here -
As a measure of total and industry wage dispersion I use the coecient
of variation, CV (= std(W)=mean(W)). Each group is weighted by its share
of the total wage sum. When computing industry variation in wages I use
the share of wages for white- and blue-collar workers for each industry and
time-period, VitW and VitB, respectively. Hence, the following measures for








where t=1992:3, ... ,1999:2 and i=1, ... ,14. Figure 3 depicts the co-
ecient of variation of wages for the period 1992-99. The mean coecient
of variation for the whole period is 0.14 for blue-collar workers and 0.17 for
white-collar workers. Industry means are presented in Table 1.
The Short Term Employment Statistics contain quarterly information on
the stock of permanent and temporary contracts as well as direct information
on hires and separations for permanent and temporary workers. A represen-
tative sample is drawn from the population of private-sector establishments
of all sizes in Sweden, stratied according to industry aliation and establish-
ment size. The establishments are randomly divided into three equal groups.
Each group responds every quarter to questions on employment and worker
turnover for one month each. The information on the number of employees
refers to a particular date in the month, while separations and hires refer
to ows during the entire month. As an example, one third of the sampled
establishments in the second quarter report information for April, while the
other two groups report the corresponding information for May and June.
The information on establishment employment as well as hires and separa-
tions is supplied for both permanent (time unlimited) and temporary (time
limited) contracts, separately for men and for women (see Arai & Heyman
(2000) for more details on the data).
10Job ows are computed on the basis of the changes in number of employ-
ees (n) at establishment (e) over time (t) . Job Creation (JCR) and Job




; if net  ()ne;t 1 (10)
Net employment growth is equal to the dierence between JCR and JDR
whereas job reallocation is equal to the sum of JCR and JDR. Table 2
presents mean quarterly gross job ow rates for the period 1992-99.
- Table 2 about here -
Job creation is on average 4 percent and varies between 2 and 6 percent.
The corresponding gure for job destruction is 5 percent, varying between
3 and 6 percent. The mean job reallocation rate is 9 percent. Gross job
ows are higher in non-manufacturing than in manufacturing. If we study
individual industries for 14 two-digit industries we see that highest job re-
allocation rates are observed in hotel, construction and real estate. The
lowest job reallocation rates are observed in textiles, chemistry and metal
and manufacturing.
5 Empirical Specication
I will use the following empirical specication to test equation (8):
JRRit = 0 + 1WDISPit + 2TEMPit + 3OV ERTit + 4NETit + i + "it
(11)
where JRRit is job reallocation in sector i at time t, WDISP is wage
dispersion, TEMP is the fraction of temporary employees to total employ-
ment and OV ERT is the fraction of overtime hours to total hours worked.
i is a time-invariant industry-specic eect and "it is the usual residual. All
equations include NET, net employment change, reecting the current state
of the business cycle.
Equation (8) states job reallocation as a function of wage dispersion, ad-
justment costs and the use of overtime. The coecient of variation will be
used as a measure of wage dispersion. I use the fraction of temporary employ-
ment as a proxy for labor adjustment costs. A high fraction of temporary la-
bor will lead to lower adjustment costs when rms' stock of employees change.
Information on overtime is only available for blue-collar workers. All vari-
ables are industry sector means (6 manufacturing and 8 non-manufacturing
11industries), roughly corresponding to the two-digit system of industry clas-
sication. In 1993 the Swedish industry classication changed system from
SNI69 to SNI92. The 14 industries analyzed in this paper are constructed in
such a way so as to enable comparisons over time. To check for robustness to
industry classication, all equations are re-estimated using the new industry
classication. This corresponds to data for on 47 industries for the period
1993 to 1999. Results are, with a few exceptions unchanged.
I will also estimate equation (11) with job creation and job destruction
separately as dependent variables. The motivation is that if wages are more
rigid downward than upward, the eect of wage dispersion on job turnover
will dier between job creation and job destruction. More specically, wage
dispersion ought to have a larger impact on job destruction than on job
creation.10
The xed-eect model assumes that the industry specic eect, vi, is
xed. The random-eect model assumes that the industry specic error
term is random and drawn from a common distribution and assumed to be
independent with the independent variables. The random-eect estimator
is a weighted average of the estimates produced by the between and within
estimators. This means that both cross-sectional variation and time-series
variation is taken into account which makes it more ecient than the xed-
eects estimator. A priori it is not obvious which model should be used.
To test for the presence of industry-specic eects, several tests can be
applied. One test is the Breusch and Pagan LM-test for random eects. The
null-hypothesis is that the variance for the industry-specic eects is equal to
zero. Rejection of the null is a sign of presence of industry-specic eects. As
can be seen in Table 4, the estimated test statistic is signicantly dierent
from zero in four out of ve regressions, indicating presence of industry-
specic eects.
To discriminate between the xed-eects and the random-eect models,
the Hausman test is appropriate (see Baltagi (1995)). If the correlation be-
tween vi and the regressors is dierent from zero, the GLS estimator becomes
biased and inconsistent. This is not the case for xed-eect estimation. The
Hausman test compares the two estimators.11 The Hausman tests presented
10Recently, several papers have used survey data consisting of interviews with managers
and labor representatives to explore the mechanism behind nominal wage rigidity and why
nominal wages are so insensitive to macroeconomic shocks (see e.g. Agell & Lundborg
(1999) and Bewley (1998)). In the Agell & Lundborg (1999) study, covering rms in the
Swedish manufacturing sector, only 2 out of 153 rms had experienced nominal wage cuts
during the 1990s. The low gure is despite the largest economic downturn in Sweden since
the 1930s, with total unemployment increasing from 4 percent in 1991 to more than 12
percent in 1993.
11Both estimators are consistent in the case of no correlation between vi and the re-
12in Table 3 and 4 and in unreported estimated equations seem to support use
of the xed-eects model.
The positive correlation between the regressors and the individual-specic
eects means that there exist unobservable eects that dier between indus-
tries. This in turn leads to a non-zero correlation between "it and Xit, i.e.
the regressors are endogenously determined. This endogeneity may be driven
by the large dierences that exist between the 14 industries. These include
dierences in wage-setting institutions, market structure, union power, and
possibilities to use temporary employees as well as technological and orga-
nizational dierences that inuence how the right-hand side variables are
determined. By performing the xed-eects technique, the i are wiped out,
leaving the within estimator unbiased and consistent for .
6 Results
Results are presented in Table 3 and 4. In Table 3, equation (11) is estimated
for the entire private sector, as well as for the manufacturing and service sec-
tors. Furthermore, estimations are also presented using the 90-10 percentile
ratio as an alternative measure of wage dispersion. Table 4 shows results
when job creation and job destruction are used separately as dependent vari-
ables. Once again I estimate equations for the entire private sector, as well
as for the manufacturing and service sectors.
- Table 3 about here -
Looking rst at the results for job reallocation, one sees that for the entire
private sector (column 1), WDISP is not signicant. The other variables all
have expected signs and are statistically signicant from zero. The positive
sign for TEMP indicates higher job turnover in rms that are in industries
with a high fraction of temporary employees. These rms can more eas-
ily adapt to labor demand changes by changing the number of temporary
employees. The estimate for TEMP is 0.42.
The coecient for the overtime variable, OV ERT, is negative and equal
to {0.53. This suggests that job turnover is lower in industries where the
number of working hours is exible. Rather than to change the number
of employees, rms can adjust the number of hours worked per employee.
Economically, it can in many situations be cost eective for a rm to vary
gressors. The xed-eect estimator is consistent whether H0 is true or not, while the
random-eect estimator is consistent and asymptotically ecient if H0 is true, but is
inconsistent if H0 is false. The test statistic is distributed as chi-two square under H0.
13the average working-time per employee rather than to adjust the number of
employees.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 point to large dierences
between industries in manufacturing and in non-manufacturing. There are
therefore reasons to believe that dierences between the two sectors inuence
the estimated coecients. An insignicant eect of wage dispersion on job
turnover at the aggregate level might mask important sector heterogeneity.
To check for sector heterogeneity I run separate regressions for manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing. These regressions are reported in columns
(2) and (3). The eect of wage dispersion on job turnover is negative and
signicant in manufacturing. The estimate of WDISP is {0.33 suggesting
that in the manufacturing sector, a more compressed wage structure will lead
to a higher job reallocation rate, a result in accordance with the Bertola &
Rogerson hypothesis. The estimate implies that a one standard deviation in-
crease in WDISP reduces JRR by 0.007. This amounts to 12 percent of the
median of JRR. The corresponding eect is 14 percent for an industry in the
10th percentile of the job reallocation distribution. Interaction terms, inter-
acting the wage dispersion variable with the share of temporary employees,
overtime and net employment change, are never signicant. Hence the eect
of wage dispersion does not systematically dier between rms with dierent
fraction of temporary employees or dierent use of overtime. Furthermore,
results are not altered when I add a time dummy for periods during which
rules for xed-term contracts were relaxed.
Turning to the non-manufacturing sector, the eect of wage dispersion
is reversed. Column (3) displays that there is a positive and signicant
correlation between WDISP and JRR in the service sector.
Hence, sector dierences seem to play an important role in determining
the relationship between the degree of wage compression and job realloca-
tion. For instance, technological and organizational dierences between, on
average, larger capital-intensive rms in manufacturing and smaller rms in
the service sectors may aect the extent to which jobs are reallocated.12 Fur-
thermore, unions have traditionally been weaker in the service sector than
in the manufacturing industry. Together with the fact that the service in-
dustry consists of smaller rms this may aect the extent to which the wage
distribution aects job turnover.
The coecients for fraction of temporary employees and overtime have
expected signs and are signicant in both sectors. Net employment change is
negative and signicant in manufacturing reecting a countercyclical pattern
12Arai & Heyman (2000) nd clear dierences both in levels and in the cyclical pattern
for job reallocation.
14in job reallocation. This is not the case in the non-manufacturing sector
where the coecient for employment growth is insignicant.13
An often-used measure for wage dispersion is the 90-10 percentile ratio.
To check for robustness of the results for WDISP, I also estimate equations
using this ratio instead of the coecient of variation. Results are displayed
in columns (4) { (6) in Table 3.
Results for the WDISP variable are qualitatively unchanged. The eect
of wage dispersion on job turnover is negative in manufacturing whereas it
is positive in non-manufacturing. The estimated coecient is equal to {0.09
in the manufacturing sector. This means that an increase in WDISP with
one standard deviation reduces JRR with 0.005. Given that the median job
reallocation rate is equal to 0.056, the estimate indicates that a one standard
deviation reduces JRR in the median industry with approximately 8 percent.
Columns (1) - (6) in Table 4 display results when job creation and job
destruction are used separately as dependent variables.
- Table 4 about here -
The wage dispersion variable is not signicant, neither in the full sample
nor in the non-manufacturing sector. In manufacturing, WDISP is negative
for both job creation and job destruction, having a higher coecient value (in
absolute terms) for job destruction. However, the variable is only signicant
for job destruction. For the manufacturing sector, results are in line with
wages being more rigid downwards than upwards, leading to higher rates
of job turnover in economic downturns than in economic upturns. Hence,
asymmetric wage rigidity, in the sense of more rigid wages downward than
upward, seems to inuence the way in which the wage distribution eects
job turnover. More specically, the combination of a compressed wage struc-
ture, more rigid wages downward than upward, and a deep recession in the
Swedish manufacturing sector in the early 1990's may explain the observed
sector dierences regarding the relationship between wage structure and re-
allocation of jobs. The sector dierences result in support for the Bertola and
Rogerson hypothesis of a negative relationship in the manufacturing sector.
However, the economic signicance is rather small. Only a small fraction of
the variation in job turnover is explained by the degree of wage compression.
Finally, to check for robustness of the results in the manufacturing sector,
and to further exploit the question of endogeneity in wage dispersion, instru-
mental variable regressions are estimated. As an instrument for WDISP I
13This result is in line with Boeri (1996) stressing that countercyclical job turnover
mainly concerns the manufacturing industry.
15use lagged values of WDISP. Columns (7)-(9) in Table 3 displays the re-
sults. In all equations, one year lags of WDISP are used as instrument for
WDISP.14 As can be seen from Table 3, IV-estimation does not alter the
results for wage dispersion. WDISP is negative and signicant in both the
equation that has total job reallocation as the dependent variable, as well as
in the equation with job destruction as the dependent variable (see column
(8) and (9)). The other explanatory variables are qualitatively unchanged.
7 Summary and Conclusions
One puzzle from the job creation and job destruction literature is the similar
ows observed in both the US and Europe. Given that the US labor market
is to a greater degree unregulated than the European market, we would
expect signicantly higher job ows in the US than in Europe. Bertola
& Rogerson propose one explanation for the observed similarities. They
argue that dierences in wage-setting institutions have an important role to
play and that there exist a positive relationship between the degree of wage-
compression and gross job ows. This means that job ows in countries with
high adjustment costs and a compressed wage structure can be similar to
those in countries with low adjustment costs and high wage dispersion.
This paper is the rst to empirically test the Bertola & Rogerson hy-
pothesis. Due to a number of problems associated with comparing job ows
and relative wages across countries, this paper use Swedish data. Using es-
tablishment data on job turnover and wages, the relationship between wage
compression and job reallocation is studied at the industry level.
The estimation technique is industry xed-eects estimation on 14 two-
digit industries. Results indicate large sector dierences regarding the eect
of the degree of wage dispersion on job reallocation. The eect is, in accor-
dance with Bertola & Rogerson, positive in the manufacturing sector. Fur-
thermore, running separate regressions for job creation and job destruction
yields a negative and signicant eect of wage dispersion on job destruction
and an insignicant eect on job creation. These results are in accordance
with wages being more rigid downwards than upwards. Turning to the non-
manufacturing sector, no signicant eects are found.
The quantitative eect of the impact of wage dispersion on job turnover is
of limited size. A one standard deviation increase in wage dispersion reduces
total job reallocation by around 10 percent.
14Results are robust to time structure choice. I have also instrumented CV in a random-
eects model without any changes in results. Furthermore, a Hausman-test comparing the
random-eects model, with and without instruments is not rejected.
16Further results include (i) a very strong positive eect of the industry-
share of temporary employees on job reallocation and (ii) a negative relation-
ship between the use of overtime and job turnover. The latter result suggests
that job reallocation is lower in industries where the number of hours worked
is exible. If the fraction of temporary employees is taken as a proxy for
adjustment costs for labor, then the results indicate that the largest part of
variation in gross job ows is explained by dierences in the cost of adjusting
labor, rather than dierences in wage dispersion.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 14 industries, 1992:3 – 1999:2. 
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  Workers 
 p(90/10) 
White-collar 
  Workers 
 p(90/10) 







Banking:    Mean  74.75  19954  0.15  0.23  0.23  1.44  1.64  1,64  0.03  0.07 
                   STD    5.24    1463  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.08  0.09  0,09  0.01  0.02 
Construct.: Mean  92.80  19087  0.11  0.16  0.13  1.28  1.46  1,34  0.02  0.11 
                   STD    4.31     894  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03  0,02  0.00  0.03 
Electr. Etc.:Mean  92.23  18189  0.11  0.12  0.12  1.28  1.30  1,29  0.04  0.04 
                    STD    5.98   1141  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.03  0,03  0.01  0.02 
Real Estate:Mean  79.41  18072  0.12  0.19  0.16  1.33  1.42  1,38  0.02  0.12 
                    STD    5.35      876  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.06  0,04  0.00  0.02 
Food:         Mean  85.21  18276  0.11  0.17  0.13  1.32  1.39  1,35  0.03  0.15 
                   STD    5.17   1502  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.05  0,04  0.00  0.03 
Hotel-Res.:Mean  72.21  16787  0.13  0.15  0.13  1.36  1.39  1,37  0.01  0.28 
                   STD    3.23     915  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.06  0,05  0.01  0.04 
Chemistry: Mean  90.74  20099  0.13  0.14  0.14  1.37  1.38  1,38  0.04  0.06 
                    STD    6.41    1633  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05  0,04  0.00  0.01 
Machinery:Mean  88.80  19537  0.12  0.16  0.13  1.32  1.37  1,35  0.04  0.05 
                    STD    5.94   1457  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05  0,04  0.01  0.01 
Mining:     Mean  106.34  19301  0.13  0.13  0.13  1.37  1.40  1,38  0.06  0.08 
                   STD    7.61    1480  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.07  0,04  0.01  0.04 
Oth. Serv.: Mean  80.67  17990  0.18  0.22  0.22  1.50  1.71  1,68  0.02  0.14 
                   STD    4.25    1156  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.04  0,04  0.00  0.01 
Textile:      Mean  76.61  17483  0.12  0.16  0.13  1.30  1.48  1,35  0.02  0.04 
                   STD    4.85      953  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.06  0,02  0.00  0.01 
Trade:        Mean  80.08  17820  0.13  0.20  0.17  1.33  1.55  1,46  0.02  0.12 
                   STD    5.23    1133  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03  0,03  0.00  0.01 
Transport:  Mean  87.86  16718  0.16  0.19  0.17  1.37  1.47  1,42  0.04  0.12 
                   STD    5.98    1384  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.04  0,03  0.01  0.02 
Wood etc.: Mean  96.14  18413  0.17  0.18  0.17  1.49  1.42  1,46  0.04  0.06 
                   STD    6.82    1533  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.07  0,05  0.00  0.01 
                     
Manufact.: Mean  90.64  18851  0.13  0.15  0.14  1.36  1.41  1.38  0.04  0.07 
                   STD   11.06    1672  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.01  0.04 
Nonmanu.:Mean  82.50  18077  0.14  0.18  0.17  1.36  1.49  1.45  0.03  0.12 
                   STD    8.75   1510  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.14  0.14  0.01  0.07 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Gross job flows. 1992:3 – 1999:2. 
        Job 
Creation 
      Job 
Destruction 
       Job 
Reallocation 
Net Empl. 
  Change 
Private sector  Mean  0.04  0.05  0.09  0.00 
  STD  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Manufacturing  Mean  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.00 
  STD  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Non-manufacturing  Mean  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.00 
  STD  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03 
   22
        Table 3. Panel estimations. Fixed-effects regressions. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
  JRR  JRR  JRR  JRR  JRR  JRR 
             
WDISP   0.09   0.26**  -0.33*    0.02   0.09**  -0.09*  
  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
TEMP   0.30*   0.25*   0.38*   0.30*   0.22**   0.38* 
  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
OVERT  -0.56*  -0.54*  -0.56***  -0.55*  -0.53*  -0.62*** 
  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.32)  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.32) 
NET  -0.15**  -0.11  -0.15***  -0.16**  -0.16  -0.16*** 
  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Constant   0.04**   0.03   0.11*    0.03  -0.04   0.17*  
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
             
Industry  All   Non-
manuf.  Manuf.  All   Non-
manuf.  Manuf. 
Measure of 
wage disp.
  CV  CV  CV  p(90/10)  p(90/10)  p(90/10) 
             



























2    0.78   0.76   0.52   0.78   0.76   0.51 
F   67.23   39.11   18.79   66.76   41.16   20.42 
N   392   224   168    392   224   168 
T     28    28   28    28    28    28 
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Table 4. Panel estimations. Fixed-effects regressions. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9) 
  JCR  JCR  JCR  JDR  JDR  JDR  JRR  JCR  JDR 
                   
WDISP   0.05   0.12  -0.10   0.04   0.14   -0.23***  -0.56**  -0.09  -0.48*** 
  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.26)  (0.18)  (0.29) 
TEMP   0.55*   0.50*   0.57*  -0.24*  -0.25*  -0.19*   0.40*   0.63*   -0.23* 
  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
OVERT   0.14   0.10*   0.52***  -0.70*  -0.64*  -1.08*  -0.82**   0.74*  -1.56* 
  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.29)  (0.47) 
NET   0.21*   0.34*  -0.02  -0.37*  -0.45*  -0.13  -0.18   0.10  -0.28** 
  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
Constant  -0.02  -0.04*  -0.01   0.06*   0.07*    0.12*   0.16  -0.02   0.19* 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
                   
Industry  All   Non-
manuf.  Manuf.  All   Non-
manuf.  Manuf.  Manuf.   Manuf.  Manuf.  
Measure of 
wage disp.
  CV  CV  CV  CV  CV  CV  CV  CV  CV 
                   
Hausman-test    63.58  
p=0.00 




  79.21 
p=0.00 
  50.50 
p=0.00 
  45.75 





  43.45 
p=0.00 
   16.70 
 p=0.00 
  67.69 
p=0.00 
    3.94 
p=0.05 
    6.32 
p=0.01       
R
2       0.74      0.72       0.69      0.54      0.56      0.32     0.51      0.72     0.34 
F    50.56    40.75     21.67    25.17    18.03    10.84    13.94    21.38     6.51 
N   392   224   168  392  224   168  144  144  144 
T     28     28     28    28    28    28    28    28    28 
                   
 
 
Notes:   (i) * indicate significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and *** at 10%-level. 
             (ii) Columns (7) - (9) are estimated using 2SLS. 
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Figure 3. Wage Dispersion in the Swedish Private
 Sector, 1992:3-1999:2 (Coefficient of Variation)